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RECENT CASES
trustee may not obtain any advantage over the beneficiary by the slightest
misrepresentation or concealment,17 it would seem that a physician must
make a full disclosure of any defects in his treatment or the patient may hold
him liable on a fraud theory.
North Dakota is among the states that have provided a special statutory
limitation for malpractice actions.' 8 However, only two North Dakota mal-
practice cases have raised the statute as a defense.19 One case was dismissed
for lack of evidence,20 and the other held that the statute of limitation was
not a good defense. '
M. R. MCINTEE
STATUTES - INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION - ELECTORS' AUTHoRI-
ZATION TO INCREASE TAX LEVY PAST "LEGAL LIMIT" WHERE "LEGAL LIMIT"
SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED BY LEGISLATURE. - In the year 1946 the governing
board of the Osago School District decided that the amount of money which
would be raised by a levy of taxes at the rate of 22 mills - the maximum
amount then permitted 1 - would be insufficient to meet the needs of the
district. Following statutory procedures, the question of increasing the tax
levy fifty per cent above the 22 mill limit was submitted to the electors of
the district at a special election.2 The increase was approved by the voters
and the maximum tax limit was thus raised an additional eleven mills, mak-
ing the total limit thirty-three mills. In 1947 the legislature amended the
statute to permit school districts to levy taxes not to exceed thirty-six mills.
The school district officials thereupon took the position that the permission
to make an excess levy which they had received at the election was still
valid, and made a levy of 50.12 mills, which was 14.12 mills in excess of the
thirty-six mill limitation. Plaintiff, a taxpayer, brought an action to recover
taxes paid under protest, contending that a new excess levy could not be
made without a further authorization from the voters of the school district.
Held, judgment for plaintiff. The amended statute furnished no basis to
which school district officers might apply the percentage of increase voted
by school districts in elections held when the prior limit of 22 mills was in
effect. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Severson, 50 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1952).
It must be conceded that if the validity of the excess tax computed on
the thirty-six mill base depended on a retrospective effect 3 being given to
17. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0109 (1943).
18. See note 11 supra.
19. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 -(1947) (in husband's action
against surgeon for loss of wife's consortium and expenses resulting from ineffective
sterilivation operation, whereupon she thereafter gave birth to a child, permanently
impairing her health, held his cause of action arose after the wife became pregnant
and was not barred by limitations); Scheid v. Cavanagh, 65 N.D. 596, 260 N.W.
619 (1935) (wooden applicator left in Plantiff's nostril without discovery for three
years).
20. Scheid v. Cavanagh, 65 N.D. 596, 260 N.W. 619 (1935).
21. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
1. The statute in force at the time was N.D. Rev. Code §57-1514 (1943).
2. The governing statutes may be found in Chapter 57-16, N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
3. "Retrospective or retroactive laws are generally defined, from a legal view
point, as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws
or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability, in respect
to transactions or considerations already past." Harlan v. State, 31 Ala.App. 478,
18 So.2d 744 (1944).
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the 1947 amendment, the tax was invalid because there is a presumption that
amendatory statutes as well as original enactments are prospective and will
not be deemed to have retroactive operation unless the legislature has express-
ly enunciated such an intention.4 There was no such indication of inten-
tion in the 1947 amendment. However, it is submitted that the use of the
amended statute to justify the excess levy on the thirty-six mill base did
not need to be predicated on its being retroactive and that, since the
authorization for the excess levy was given by electors of the district in a
special election pursuant to statutory provisions and had the legal force of
a local law in pari materia with the general tax statutes it should not have
been considered defeated or nullified by a subsequent general statute if rea-
sonable grounds for supporting it could be found. 5 "It is not usual," Cooley
states, "to modify or take away special powers by general laws; and if it
is intended to do so in any particular case, it is reasonable to suppose that
the legislature would do so in unequivocal language. When this is not
done the general law will be read as intending to leave the special powers
in force." 6
A review of the several statutes which are in pari materia with the
amendatory statute involved in the principal case suggests that rules regard-
ing incorporation by general reference 7 are applicable to it and might
support the continuing operation of the authorization after the passage of
the amendment so as to validate the levy on the thirty-six mill base. It is an
established rule of interpretation that if an act is otherwise complete in
itself, the adoption of provisions of existing general law regulating the
subject in hand by some expression like "same as is provided by law" or
"in the manner now provided by law" will be considered a general refer-
ence including not only the law in force at the date of the statute's adop-
tion but also the law in force when the adopting law is invoked.8 This
means that such a statute will embrace all amendment and modifications
of the law subsequent to the time the referring statute was enacted.,
It is significant that this principle has been generally followed in the
application of the original statute governing mill levies by school districts.'0
This statute prescribes the maximum mill levy rate "per dollar of net assess-
ed valuation," thus adopting by reference the basic taxable valuation of
property established in §57-0228, North Dakota Revised Code of 1943,
4. Ford Motor Co. v. State, .59 N.D. 792, 231 N.W. 883 (1930); Blackemore
v. Cooner, 15 N.D. 5, 106 N.W. 566 (1906).
5. Hemmer v. United States, 204 Fed. 898 (8th Cir. 1912), Reeves Co. v.
Bruening, 16 N.D. 398, 114 N.W. 313 (1907).
6. 2 Cooley, Taxation §536 (4th ed. 1924).
7. "If a provision is ambiguous, it should be construed with those acts relating
to the same subject matter which are enacted with it, or to which it referred, or
which refer to it." Sutherland, Statutory Construction §5205 (3d ed. 1943).
8. Cole v. Donovan, 106 Mich. 692, 64 N.W. 741 (1895); George Williams
College v. Village of Williams Bay, 242 Wis. 311, 7 N.W.2d 891 (1943); cf.
Burns v. Kelley, 221 Ky. 385, 298 S.W. 987 (1927).
9. Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276 (1859) (where act provided that property in
bands of executor should be distributed according to "the provisions of the law regu-
lating descents," statute referred to any law of descent in force at the time that the,
right to the distribution might become vested); State ex rel. Miller v. Leich, 166 Ind.
680, 78 N.E. 189 (1906); Kugler's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 123 (1867) (where act
governing division of election districts provided that the proceedings "shall be the same
as in the . . . alteration of the lines of townships," act included not only law in force
at time of its enactment but subsequent amendments).
10. N.D. Rev. Code §57-1514 (1943).
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which was fifty per cent of the actual value of the taxable property. When
this latter section was amended in 1945 and the basic assessed valuation
raised to seventy-five per cent,1 t the mill levy was computed on the basis
of this increased percentage, and when, in 1946, the tax base was again
reduced to fifty per cent by popular referendum,12 the mill levy was
computed accordingly. The reference statute adopted not only the law
in force at the time it was enacted, but also the law in force when it was
subsequently invoked.
It was argued by Mr. Justice Christianson, in a vigorous dissenting
opinion in the principal case, that precisely the same principle was applic-
able in dealing with the effect of the excess levy statute and the electors'
authorization to make an excess levy. The excess levy statute 1 : confers
upon school district authorities the power to secure approval of additional
levies in the following words: "Electors of any school district may authorize
in the manner provided in this chapter the levy of taxes in such school
district in excess of the limitation otherwise provided by law for that pur-
pose." Clearly this adopts as a base not only the legal mill rate existing at
the time it was enacted but also the limit prescribed by the amendatory
statute of 1947. Should the law be invoked subsequent to that date the
authorizations would undoubtedly be for percentage increases above tle
mill limits set in the amendment.
The ballots on which the electors signified their approval of the excess
levy were also couched in tenns of general reference: "Shall Osago School
District No. 58 levy taxes for the year (or years) 1946, 1947 which shall
exceed the legal limit by 50%..... ?" Reasonably, the term "legal limit" on
this ballot would refer to the mill rate in force at any time the authori-
zation should be invoked and the fifty per cent increase would be the
amount that the governing board of the district could levy in 1946 and
1947 in excess of what they would have been able to levy in these years
if there were no authorization. The question in the instant case, arising
from the fact that the authorization was for a two-year period and the
legislature changed the mill levy rate before the levy had been made for
the second year, is whether the excess levy for the first year can be com-
puted on the basis of one legal mill rate and the levy for the first year on
another. It will be recognized that the authorization itself did not consti-
tute a tax levy. This is a separate act which the law requires be perforned
annually "by the governing body of each school district" and which must
be "based upon an itemized budget statement which shall show the coin-
plete expenditure program of the district for the current fiscal year" express-
ed in dollars and cents., The authorization was merely a kind of enabling
act to be invoked by the governing board if it was found that the budget
for a given year exceeded the amount which could be raised by the legal
mill limit, the allowable excess to be determined by the actual need of the
district but not to exceed fifty per cent of the mill limit.
As has been pointed out, an enactment containing a general reference
operates on the law in force when the act is invoked. In the instant case,
the first year the authorization was invoked and the excess tax levied the
11. N.D. Sess. L. 1945, c. 317.
12. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Severson, 50 N.W.2d 889, 900 (N.D. 1952).
13. Chapter 57-16, N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
14. N.D. Rev. Code §57-1513 (1943)..
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legal limit in force was twenty-two mills; the second year it was invoked
the legal limit was thirty-six mills. In applying the current legal limits,
the district officials thus gave the authorization a strictly prospective oper-
ation, and the conclusion of the court that the amendment to the mill levy
limitation statute was given retroactive effect seems questionable. The
act which actually imposed the obligation to pay the excess levy on the
amended mill rate was not performed until after the enactment of the
amendment. A statute is not retroactive because it draws on antecedent
facts for its operation. 15 Rather its application in this case appears, from
the very language of the several related statutes, without straining the words
beyond their ordinary and accepted meanings, to be part of a purely pro-
spective implementation of the electors' authorization, which had incorpor-
ated within itself the provisions of the amendatory statute..
A brief discussion of one further aspect of the court's opinion may be
worthwhile. It is a generally accepted rule, relied upon by the court in
the instant case, that where the meaning of a tax statute is doubtful, the
statute is to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the tax-
payer.16 It may be pointed out, however, that care should be taken not
to extend the rule so far as to destroy the real intent and meaning of the
statute. In the first place, there must be a reasonable doubt concerning
meaning.17 The statutes are to be construed according to their intent 16
and words are to be given their ordinary meaning.1 9 Then, if there is an
apparent ambiguity or doubt, or a question of the lack of equality or uni-
formity in the imposition of the tax burden,20 the doubt should be resolved
in favor of the taxpayer. In the instant case, there may be a question as
to whether the construction placed upon the statutes by the district offi-
cials carried into effect the intent of the electors at the time they approved
the percentage increase above the "legal limit," since they may not have
anticipated that the legal limit would be changed. This must be considered.
It is well known, however, that the tax base can be changed by the legis-
lature at any time,2 ' and that it has been changed frequently, both as to
the net taxable valuation and the mill rate, and when the electors approved
the authorization of an excess levy for a period greater than one year, this
contingency, it appears, could reasonably have been foreseen. The authori-
zation itself was definite and set forth in unequivocal terms the conditions
of the levy. Any doubtful meaning would appear to flow from the voters
themselves, who are also the taxpayers and the beneficiaries of the tax.
15. Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (1934); People v. Board of Trustees
of Firemen's Pension Fund, 103 Colo. 1, 82 P.2d 765 (1938); State v. Alden Mills,
202 La. 416, 12 So.2d 204 (1943).
16. National Linen Service Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 237 Ala. 360, 186
So. 478 (1939): Pappanostos v. State Tax Commission, 235 Ala. 50, 177 So. 158
(1936); see Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation - Cases and Materials 42 et seq.
(1952).
17. "No rule . requires the court to raise doubts as to the meaning of an
act, where, in giving words their plain and usual meaning, no doubt can possibly
arise." Moran v. Leccony Smokeless Coal Co., 122 W.Va. 405, 10 S.E.2d 578 (1940).
18. Compare Professor Max Radin's attack on legislature intent as a "trans-
parent and absurd fiction," Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863.
870 (1930), with James Landis' defense, A Note on Statutory Interpretation," 43
Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930).
19. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 312 (3 ed. 1943).
20. Gould 'v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1915); National Linen Service Corp. v.
State Tax Commission, 237 Ala. 360, 186 So. 478 (1939).
21. State ex rel. Arnot v. Flaherty, 45 N.D. 549, 178 N.W. 790 (1920).
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To hold that they are in a position to challenge the validity of the tax on
the ground that they did not intend what they voted for seems to be
extending the rule too far.22 "The rule that tax laws shall be construed
favorably for the taxpayers is not a reason for creating or exaggerating
doubts of their meaning." 23
Moreover, it appears that adherence to the rule of strict construction
is not as general as it once was, and in fact it may be suggested that there
is a trend toward a less rigid rule. 2 4 Even the court of North Dakota,
while often reiterating its allegiance to the strict rule, has sometimes taken
exception to it, as in Goldberg v. Gray,2 5 where it stated that "We do not
question the rule. However, the ultimate purpose sought to be attained by
the construction of any statute is to arrive at the intention of the law-making
body that enacted it."
This emphasis on effectuating the intent and purpose of the legislative
body bringing the law into being, whether it be a local tax law or a general
state law on the same subject, is paramount. In the instant case the earlier
enactments simply and clearly indicate adoption of the amended mill rate
by reference, and since the legislature, in enacting the subsequent amend-
ment, did not expressly repeal or cancel this power, and since simultaneous
operation of the two acts is not impossible, it would seem that effect should
have been given to the levy made pursuant to the electors' authorization.
A preponderance of evidence showing a contrary intent on the part of the
lawmakers, drawn from extrinsic sources, might contravert such a conclu-
sion.
Mits. MAuE FEIDLER
22. "We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived or
framed would yield results more zonsonant with fairness and reason. We take this
statute as we find it." Cardozo, 1. in Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1983).
23. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925) syllabus 3.
24. 2 Cooley, Taxation 1505 (4th ed. 1924); 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construc-
tion 297 (3d ed. 1943); Hellerstein, op cit. supra note 16, at 42.
25. 70 N.D. 663, 297 N.W. 124 (1941).
